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CENTRAL

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Nehru Considers Meeting With Chou En-lai'in April

Prime Minister Nehru reportedly is considering inviting Chou En-lai to New Delhi just before or just after the East-West summit meeting in an effort to break the Sino-Indian border deadlock. The Indian leader is said to be willing now to relax his demand that the Chinese withdraw from Indian-claimed territory and accept the Mc Mahon line before any such ministerial meeting takes place.

This shift in view is probably tentative, pending discussions with Khrushchev in mid-February and a reassessment at that time of Indian public opinion. In order to appear responsive to Khrushchev's advice or assurances, Nehru might reply to Peiping's 26 December note with a mere acknowledgment at this time and wait until after the Khrushchev conversations to return his ambassador to Peiping to make arrangements for the meeting.

Nehru's reported shift regarding pre-conditions may be the result of advice he received from his ambassadors to Peiping and Moscow. It may also reflect additional persuasive efforts by the Voroshilov-Kozlov party now in India. Any announcement indicating such a shift in Nehru's thinking would be widely criticized within India as a retreat from a just position.

The Chinese, who have persistently called for a top-level
meeting unfettered by any "prior conditions" which would hamper
their bargaining position, would regard such a shift by Nehru
as a concession. Chou has already implied that "activities
hostile to Sino-Indian friendship" might preclude India as a site
and expressed a preference for meeting in some third coun-
try, possibly Burma.

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	French Army Reportedly Refuses to Use Force Against Algerian Settlers	25X	(1
	The European extremists barricaded in downtown Algiers, meanwhile, have built up their numbers from 1,000 on 24 January to about 4,000, and appear to be procuring supplies from outside the barricades. They are apparently counting on the reluctance of the French Army to attack them to induce a statement from De Gaulle pledging a "French Algeria." Demonstrations in sympathy with the Algiers insurgents have taken place in numerous Algerian cities, including Oran, Bone, and Constantine; none of these appear to have gotten out of control, however, and rightists in outlying areas will probably be governed by the outcome in Algiers.		
	The US Consul General in Algiers reported on 26 January that most French authorities there believe it is now clear that it would be impossible to apply the self-determination policy for Algeria announced by De Gaulle on 16 September. Marshal Juin is reported to have urged De Gaulle to modify his policy at least to the extent of assuring the European settlers they will not be "left in the lurch" by the French government. Debré yesterday assured Soustelle, who together with several other cabinet members had threatened to resign, that De Gaulle will state publicly-though without revoking his self-determination policy-that the French government and people desire and will work for the "Frenchification" of Algeria.	25 25)	5X <1 —
	In view of the French cabinet's split on 25 January on the question of using force against the settler insurgents, De Gaulle may be obliged to give such assurances to avoid the collapse of		
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the Debré government. Such a gesture would probably satisfy most of the military dissidents and influence them to try to persuade the settler insurgents to abandon their barricades. Premier Debré, in his appeal to the settlers to lay down their arms, cited De Gaulle's earlier explanation that the entire military, economic, and social program being carried out in Algeria is designed to ensure the permanence of French presence there. As a further compromise gesture, De Gaulle might elaborate on the reference to partition he made in his 16 September speech announcing his self-determination plan.

An alternative for De Gaulle would be to invoke the provisions of the constitution which gives the president full powers in a national emergency. He might accompany any such action with announcement of a plan to go to the people in a referendum to seek long-term dictatorial powers. Even with such a dramatic gesture, however, he would still face the problem of imposing his will on the army [

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III. THE WEST

Widespread Violence Threatens in Bolivia

All rural militia units in the Cochabamba valley of central Bolivia have mobilized, and widespread violence threatens. Considerable unrest has arisen from bitter rivalry between the two wings of the governing Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) over selection of presidential and congressional nominees at its convention 15-21 February. This led on 23 January to a violent battle in the mining town of Huanuni, formerly a stronghold of the MNR right wing but now in control of Communist-led miners. Celestino Gutierrez, leader of the right-wing miners, was lynched, ten others were killed, and 32 were injured.

American Ambassador Strom notes that the violent death of Gutierrez will intimidate all anti-Communist labor leaders if moderate President Siles allows it to go unpunished. Siles, however, has thus far ordered the armed forces to keep out of Huanuni. Followers of right-wing leader Guevara are pressing him to resign as foreign minister over the incident, but he has thus far insisted he cannot leave his post on the eve of Mexican President Lopez Mateos' visit beginning 30 January.

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